Official Comments
 Article #  

 
7.1.7
(Force majeure)

(1) Non-performance by a party is excused if that party proves that the non-performance was due to an impediment beyond its control and that it could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences.
(2) When the impediment is only temporary, the excuse shall have effect for such period as is reasonable having regard to the effect of the impediment on the performance of the contract.
(3) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment and its effect on its ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the impediment, it is liable for damages resulting from such non-receipt.
(4) Nothing in this article prevents a party from exercising a right to terminate the contract or to withhold performance or request interest on money due.


 
Official Comment
 1. The notion of force majeure

This Article covers the ground covered in common law systems by the doctrines of frustration and impossibility of performance and in civil law systems by doctrines such as force majeure, Unmöglichkeit, etc. but it is identical with none of these doctrines. The term “force majeure” was chosen because it is widely known in international trade practice, as confirmed by the inclusion in many international contracts of so-called “force majeure” clauses.

Illustration

1. A, a manufacturer in country X, sells a nuclear power station to B, a utility company in country Y. Under the terms of the contract A undertakes to supply all the power station’s requirements of uranium for ten years at a price fixed for that period, expressed in US dollars and payable in New York. The following separate events occur:
(i) After five years the currency of country Y collapses to 1% of its value against the dollar at the time of the contract. B is not discharged from liability as the parties have allocated this risk by the payment provisions.
(ii) After five years the Government of country Y imposes foreign exchange controls which prevent B paying in any currency other than that of country Y. B is excused from paying in US dollars. A is entitled to terminate the contract to supply uranium.
(iii) After five years the world uranium market is cornered by a group of speculators. The price of uranium on the world market rises to ten times the contract figure. A is not excused from delivering uranium as this is a risk which was foreseeable at the time of making the contract.

2. Effects of force majeure on the rights and duties of the parties

The Article does not restrict the rights of the party who has not received performance to terminate if the non-performance is fundamental. What it does do, where it applies, is to excuse the non-performing party from liability in damages.
In some cases the impediment will prevent any performance at all but in many others it will simply delay performance and the effect of the Article will be to give extra time for performance. It should be noted that in this event the extra time may be greater (or less) than the length of the interruption because the crucial question will be what is the effect of the interruption on the progress of the contract.

Illustration

2. A contracts to lay a natural gas pipeline across country X. Climatic conditions are such that it is normally impossible to work between 1 November and 31 March. The contract is timed to finish on 31 October but the start of work is delayed for a month by a civil war in a neighbouring country which makes it impossible to bring in all the piping on time. If the consequence is reasonably to prevent the completion of the work until its resumption in the following spring, A may be entitled to an extension of five months even though the delay was itself of one month only.

3. Force majeure and hardship

This Article must be read together with Chapter 6, Section 2 of the Principles dealing with hardship (see Comment 6 on Article 6.2.2).

4. Force majeure and contract practice

The definition of force majeure in paragraph (1) of this Article is necessarily of a rather general character. International commercial contracts often contain much more precise and elaborate provisions in this regard. The parties may therefore find it appropriate to adapt the content of this Article so as to take account of the particular features of the specific transaction.

5. Long-term contracts

Force majeure, like hardship, is typically relevant in long-term contracts (see Comment 5 on Article 6.2.2), and the same facts may present both hardship and force majeure (see Comment 6 on Article 6.2.2). In the case of hardship, the Principles encourage negotiation between the parties to the end of continuing the relationship rather than dissolving it (see Article 6.2.3).
Similarly, in the case of force majeure, parties to long-term contracts can anticipate that, in light of the duration and nature of the relationship and, possibly, large initial investments whose value would be realised only over time, they would have an interest in continuing rather than terminating their business relationship. Accordingly, the parties may wish to provide in their contract for the continuation, whenever feasible, of the business relationship even in the case of force majeure, and envisage termination only as a last resort. Such provisions can take a number of forms.

Illustration

3. A long-term contract contains a provision to the effect that, except where it is clear from the outset that an impediment to a party’s performance is of a permanent nature, the obligations of the party affected by the impediment are temporarily suspended for the length of the impediment, but for no more than 30 days, and any right of either party to terminate the contract is similarly suspended. The provision also states that, at the end of that time period, if the impediment continues the parties will negotiate with a view to agreeing to prolong the suspension on terms that are mutually agreed. It also states that, if such agreement cannot be reached, disputed matters will be referred to a dispute board pursuant to the ICC Dispute Board Rules. The parties are bound by that procedure.